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AIRPORT SEIZURES OF LUGGAGE WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE: ARE THEY
"REASONABLE"?
Drug smuggling has become a pervasive problem in the United
States.' Major metropolitan cities on both coasts, particularly New
York, Miami, Los Angeles, and San Diego, are the primary entry
points for narcotics brought into the United States.2 From these
"source cities" smugglers will frequently fly on to other major cities to
distribute their narcotics. Because there are no customs inspections for
fights within the United States, smugglers can fly with little fear of
detection.
In response to this problem, the Federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) has stationed agents in airport terminals in the
major cities of distribution. These agents are trained to detect travelers
who may be carrying narcotics. To aid the agents the DEA has created
a "drug courier profile," which details characteristics generally
associated with drug traffickers.3 When the agents spot a traveler who
1. The following is the 1980 Narcotics Intelligence Estimate (amount of drugs smuggled
into the United States in 1980):
Heroin: 4 metric tons
Cocaine: 44 metric tons
Marijuana: 12,600 metric tons
Dangerous Drugs: 275 million dosage units
Total Street Value: 79.3 billion dollars
This estimate was provided by Ted Swift, Public Information Officer for the Federal Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA).
2. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980); United States v. Van Lewis, 409
F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976), afl'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977).
3. DEA agents in Detroit created the drug courier profile in 1974. United States v. Van
Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976), af'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977). Paul
Markonni, a DEA agent in Atlanta, created a similar profile. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d
1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). The Markonni profile consists of
seven primary characteristics and four secondary characteristics. The primary characteristics are
these:
(1) arrival from or departure to an identified source city;
(2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases;
(3) unusual itinerary, such as a rapid turnaround time for a very lengthy airplane
trip;
(4) use of an alias;
(5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency in the many thousands of dollars,
usually on the person, in briefcases or bags;
(6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of small denomination currency;
and
(7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited by passengers.
The secondary characteristics are these:
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fits the profile, they approach him, identify themselves, ask a few
questions, and often ask to see his airline ticket. If they become
suspicious, they ask to inspect the passenger's luggage; if he refuses,
they may take the luggage and submit it to a sniff search by a narcotics
detector dog.4
It is not clear whether such a "seizure" of the traveler's luggage5
without probable cause6 is constitutional. The Supreme Court has held
that Terry v. Ohio7 permits law enforcement officers to seize and detain
persons briefly in airports on only a reasonable suspicion8 that they are
engaged in criminal activity.9 The Court will soon decide whether
Terry allows airport seizures of luggage without probable cause.10
Early lower court decisions upheld such a seizure on the grounds that
Terry permits a seizure and detention of luggage without probable
cause for an even longer period than it permits a seizure and detention
(1) the almost exclusive use of public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in depart-
ing from the airport;
(2) immediately making a telephone call after deplaning;
(3) leaving a false or fictitious call-back telephone number with the airline being
utilized; and
(4) excessively frequent travel to source or distribution cities.
Id
4. There is general agreement among courts that a sniff search is not a search within the
purview of the fourth amendment and is therefore not subject to constitutional scrutiny. See
United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir.) (cases cited), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962
(1981). But see United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1982) (sniff search is a fourth
amendment intrusion that may be based only on a "founded" or "articulable" suspicion that the
luggage contains contraband),petitionfor cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1982) (No.
82-674). The prevailing view that a sniff search is not a search protected by the fourth amendment
has been criticized. See, e.g., 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.2(f), at 284-90 (1978); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to
Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FORDHAM L. REa. 973, 984-89 (1976); Comment, United States v.
Soils: Have the Government's Supersnfffers Come Down With a Case of Constitutional Nasal
Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410 (1976).
5. A seizure of property can be defined as physically removing property from the possession
of another. See United States v. O'Connor, 658 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Hunt, 496 F.2d 888, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1974); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 2.1, at 221-22.
6. See infra text accompanying note 21.
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See infra note 27.
8. A requirement of reasonable suspicion is less strict than a requirement of probable cause.
Reasonable suspicion requires that the law enforcement officer reasonably suspect that a person is
engaged in criminal activity, whereas probable cause requires that the officer reasonably believe
that a crime has been or is being committed. See infra text accompanying note 21.
9. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (by implication) (per curiam); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552-53 (1980); infra note 36 and accompanying text.
Justice Stewart, in a portion of the opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980), joined only by Justice Rehnquist, adopted the following test to determine when a person is
"seized": "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave." Id at 554.
10. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982).
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of the person;" two recent decisions, United States v. Place'2 and
United States v. Martell,13 however, have clouded the issue of whether
airport seizures of luggage without probable cause are constitutionally
permissible. 14
This note addresses the constitutionality of airport seizures of
luggage conducted without probable cause in the context of the Martell
and Place decisions. The note begins with an outline of general fourth
amendment principles.15 After a review of the early treatment of
airport seizures of luggage,' 6 the note details four possible approaches
that may be taken to determine the constitutionality of airport seizures
of luggage.' 7 The note concludes with a critical analysis of the
approaches and chooses an approach that strikes a balance between the
needs of law enforcement and the protection of individual rights.'8
I. GENERAL FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
All arrests and most searches and seizures 19 must be supported by
probable cause.20 Probable cause is present "where 'the facts and cir-
cumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had rea-
sonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed." 2' Although the fourth amendment war-
rant clause requires that no warrant be issued without probable cause,22
11. See United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71 (Ist Cir. 1981),petitionfor cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W.
3132 (U.S. Aug. 14, 1981) (No. 81-307); United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.), cert denied,
451 U.S. 971 (1981); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980); infra notes 38-55 and
accompanying text.
12. 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982).
13. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981),petition for cert.fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Mar. 15,
1982) (No. 81-1772).
14. Over sharp dissents, both decisions conclude that luggage can be seized without probable
cause, but the two courts differ greatly in their approaches and solutions. See infra notes 61-103
and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 60-103 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
20. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-16 (1979); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
111-12 (1975).
21. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
22.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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it does not require that all arrests and all searches and seizures be un-
dertaken with a duly executed warrant. Because arrests often involve
sudden observations of criminal behavior that necessitate swift action,
courts do not always require a warrant. 23 Under certain circumstances,
searches and seizures also do not require the issuance of a warrant.24
Warrantless searches and seizures made with probable cause are per-
mitted as "specifically established and well-delineated" exceptions to
the fourth amendment probable cause requirement. 25
Courts permit searches and seizures without probable cause in four
situations. The most far-reaching extension of any probable cause ex-
ception is the "stop and frisk" doctrine, which allows a police officer to
stop or "seize" a person on a "reasonable and articulable" suspicion
that he is engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, if the officer suspects
that the person is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a limited frisk
or "search" for weapons. 26 The Supreme Court first upheld the consti-
23. The Supreme Court has held that a warrant for a felony arrest in public places with
probable cause is not constitutionally required. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,423 (1976);
cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-89 (1980) (absent exigent circumstances, an arrest in
the individual's home cannot be made without a warrant).
24. Warrantless searches and seizures conducted with probable cause are permitted under the
following exceptions:
(a) A search incident to a lawful arrest, see e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(upheld warrantless search of arrestee's person and the area from within which he might have
obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him);
(b) A search conducted under exigent circumstances, see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973) (upheld limited warrantless search to prevent imminent destruction of evidence);
(c) Seizures of objects in "plain view," see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(officer lawfully on premises may seize evidence discovered inadvertently);
(d) A search of an automobile, see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless
search of automobile allowed in circumstances that would not justify other warrantless searches);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of an automobile permissible
because of its inherent mobility); and
(e) A search involving consent, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
25. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); accord Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356, 1363-64 & n.l (9th Cir.
1981) (Nelson, J., dissenting),pe//ionfor cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Mar. 15, 1982) (No.
81-1772).
26. The other three situations are not relevant to airport seizures of luggage. Courts do not
require probable cause for inspections and administrative searches, commonly conducted by
health, fire, or safety inspectors pursuant to a governmental regulatory scheme. See Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (upheld inspection search without probable cause that the
particular dwelling violates the housing code). Courts also permit border searches without prob-
able cause. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973). Courts justify border searches (limited to the American border or its "func-
tional equivalent," see 41meida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272) because of the need for "national self-
protection" from travelers entering the country, id (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 154 (1925)). Courts also permit law enforcement officers to seize persons while searching
physical areas pursuant to a warrant. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701, 705 (1981)
(execution of a search warrant founded on probable cause to believe that a dwelling contains
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tutionality of the "stop and frisk" in Terry v. Ohio .27
The Supreme Court justifies searches and seizures without prob-
able cause on the principle that the governmental interest in conducting
the search and seizure outweighs any intrusion on the fourth amend-
ment rights of the individual.28 In interpreting the fourth amendment
probable cause requirement there are two distinct theories that the
Court could adopt to permit searches and seizures without probable
cause. The Court may adopt a theory that the fourth amendment pro-
hibits only unreasonable searches and seizures,29 or it may adopt a the-
ory that the fourth amendment permits searches and seizures without
probable cause only as well-defined exceptions to the probable cause
requirement.30
Assuming that airport seizures of luggage without probable cause
should be permitted, 31 the particular theory that the Court adopts has a
direct bearing on whether a particular seizure will be constitutionally
permissible. If the Court adopts a reasonableness theory, it will permit
any seizure of luggage without probable cause as long as it is reason-
contraband authorizes a seizure of the occupants without probable cause to believe the occupants
are engaged in criminal activity justification is that because a search warrant has already author-
ized a significant intrusion, the seizure of the occupants represents a minimal incremental
intrusion).
27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry the Court held that law enforcement officers could search a
person briefly on only a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity and
may be armed and dangerous. Id at 30. Although the Terry Court expressly declined to decide
whether an officer could seize a person without probable cause for purely investigative purposes,
without a reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed and dangerous, id at 19 n.16, the
Court later recognized the constitutionality of such an investigative stop. See United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (Border Patrol officers permitted to seize persons for
brief "stop and inquiry" when the officers have a reasonable suspicion that the suspects are illegal
aliens); see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,440 (1980) (per curiam) (reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 560-66 (1980) (Powell,
J., concurring). Terry supplies support for allowing seizures of luggage without probable cause.
See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
28. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
29. Read literally, this is what the fourth amendment states, see supra note 22.
The theory that the fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures is
drawn from language in the Court's opinion in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699-701
(1981) ("general rule" of reasonableness is to be applied to judge searches and seizures that in-
volve limited intrusions). See supra note 26; infra note 63.
30. The Court adopted the "narrow exceptions" theory in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 208-09 (1979). See infra note 33. Recall that warrantless searches and seizures with probable
cause are permitted only as specified exceptions. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
31. There is support for the view that seizures of luggage without probable cause should not
be permitted under any circumstances. See United States v. Belcher, 685 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1981) (Nelson, J., dissenting), petition for
cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Mar. 15, 1982) (No. 81-1772); Comment, Seizing Luggage on
Less than Probable Cause, 18 AM. CRAM. L. REV. 637 (1981); infra notes 79-86 and accompanying
text.
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able.3 2 If, however, the Court adopts the view that seizures of luggage
without probable cause must fall under an exception to the probable
cause requirement, specifically the Terry exception, it must still deter-
mine the extent to which Terry should be applied to the seizure. The
Court could choose to apply the constitutional standards of Terry
equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of luggage and hold that
because seizures resulting in lengthy detentions of persons are uncon-
stitutional,33 seizures resulting in lengthy detentions of luggage are un-
constitutional as well.3 4 The Court could also -decline to apply the
Terry standards equally to seizuzes-of luggage and of persons, uphold-
ing seizures resulting in lengthy detentions of luggage on the theory
that such seizures are less intrusive than seizures of persons.
35
Thus, there are four approaches that the Court could follow: no
seizures of luggage without probable cause permitted; all reasonable
seizures permitted; seizures permitted under Terry to the same extent as
32. This approach was taken by the majority in United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d at 1360.
S ee infra notes 63-78 and accompanying text.
33. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
In Dunaway the defendant was suspected in an attempted robbery, but the police lacked
probable cause to arrest him. Nonetheless, the police took the defendant into custody, transported
him to the police station, and detained him there for interrogation. Within an hour after he was
taken into custody, the defendant made incriminating statements and was arrested. The Supreme
Court rejected the government's contention that the detention was permissible under Terry. Id at
207. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted that the detention was "in important respects
indistinguishable from a traditional arrest." Id at 212. The intrusion was much more severe than
the "stop and frisk" permitted in Terry. The Court stated: "Indeed, any 'exception' [to a require-
ment of probable cause] that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten
to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on
probable cause." Id at 213.
That the defendant was taken into custody and transported to the police station weighed
heavily in the decision. Id at 212. But it is not clear that the result necessarily would have been
different had the defendant in Dunaway been interrogated for the same length of time on the street
or in his home. The Court in Dunaway was concerned that lengthy detentions without probable
cause, if permitted, would emasculate the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. Id at
212-13; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (brief period of deten-
tion a factor that will justify a Terry stop).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has imposed a 20-minute limit on detentions of
persons without probable cause. See United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d at 1360; United States v.
Wasserteil, 641 F.2d 704,707-08 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1267
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981). In addition, the Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure authorizes an officer to stop a person in certain circumstances without probable
cause for no longer than 20 minutes. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 110.2(1) (1975).
34. This approach was taken by the majority in United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982). See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
35. This approach was taken by the dissent in United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 54, 55 (2d
Cir. 1981) (Kaufman, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982). See infra notes 98-103
and accompanying text.
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seizures of persons permitted; or seizures permitted under Terry to a
greater extent than seizures of persons permitted.
II. AIRPORT SEIZURES OF LUGGAGE
The Supreme Court has indicated that a person may be "seized"
and detained for a brief period of time in an airport on a reasonable
suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. 36 The
Supreme Court will soon rule on the constitutionality of a seizure of a
person's luggage on a reasonable suspicion; the federal courts of ap-
peals that have considered the issue have rendered widely divergent
opinions. 37
A. Early Treatment.
Two of the first cases to present the issue of whether law enforce-
ment officials could seize a person's luggage without probable cause
were United States v. Klein38 and United States v. Viegas.39 In Klein,
36. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (by implication) (per curiam); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
In Mendenhall, a three-judge plurality held that the defendant was "seized" within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment, but that the seizure was justified because the agents possessed a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 446 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J.; Burger, C.J.,
& Blackmun, J., concurring in part & in the judgment). This suspicion combined with the com-
pelling public interest in detecting drug smugglers warranted the Terry stop. Id at 561-66. Jus-
tices Stewart and Rehnquist concluded that no seizure had occurred; therefore, no interest
protected by the fourth amendment was violated. Id at 555.
In Reid, the Court held that the agent acted unlawfully when he seized the defendant because
he did not have a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a crime. Thus, the
Court implied that had the agent had a reasonable suspicion, he could have lawfully seized the
defendant. 448 U.S. at 441 ("We conclude that the agent could not. . . have reasonably sus-
pected the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of these observed circumstances.") (emphasis
added). The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Georgia Court of Appeals
for further proceedings.
On remand, the Georgia Court of Appeals held for the defendant. State v. Reid, 158 Ga.
App. 570, 274 S.E.2d 164 (1981). But the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the de-
fendant had not been "seized" and that his fourth amendment rights had therefore not been vio-
lated. See State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 369 (1981).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Regan, No. 81-1722, slip op. (1st Cir. Sept. 1, 1982); United
States v. Belcher, 685 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Corbitt, 675 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.
1982); United States v. MacDonald, 670 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Place, 660
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982); United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d
1356 (9th Cir. 1981),petitionfor cert.fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Mar. 15, 1982) (No. 81-1772);
United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); United States v.
Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. West, 495 F. Supp. 871 (D. Mass. 1980), af 'd,
651 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 198 1),petition for cert.fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3132 (U.S. Aug. 14, 1981) (No. 81-
307); United States v. Casey, No. H-78-74 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 1979) (unreported), aft'd, No. 79-1109
(2d Cir. June 14, 1979) (unpublished order).
38. 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980).
39. 639 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
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Chicago DEA agents seized two travelers' suitcases without probable
cause. The suitcases were later discovered to contain narcotics.40 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the seizures, citing two
Supreme Court decisions to support its holding.41
The Klein court first looked to United States v. Van Leeuwen,42 in
which the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional the brief detention
of two suspicious-looking packages sent through the mail. The Court
reasoned that the detention involved "no possible invasion of the right
'to be secure' in the 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' protected by
the Fourth Amendment against 'unreasonable searches and
seizures.' " 43 The Klein court viewed the detention in Van Leeuwen as
analogous to the detention of the suitcases. The court recognized "the
possible difference between the privacy interest in packages surren-
dered in the mails and that in luggage carried by an individual,"" but
concluded that the defendants' privacy interests were "adequately
protected." 45
In support of its conclusion that the defendants' privacy interests
were protected, the Klein court cited Arkansas v. Sanders,4 6 in which
the Court refused to extend the automobile search exception 47 to per-
mit the warrantless search of luggage found in the defendant's automo-
bile. In Sanders, the Court recognized the existence of a significant
expectation of privacy in the contents of luggage; this expectation, ac-
40. The agents, alerted by a deputy sheriff at Fort Lauderdale's airport, stopped the defend-
ants at O'Hare Airport. After learning that one defendant was traveling under an assumed name
and after both defendants denied having keys to open the locked suitcases they were carrying, the
agents developed a reasonable suspicion that the suitcases contained narcotics. The agents told
the defendants that they were free to go, but that their suitcases would be detained until the agents
could get a search warrant. After a drug detector dog conducted a sniff search, the agents ob-
tained a search warrant and discovered cocaine in the suitcases. The defendants were convicted,
and they appealed.
41. See United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d at 25-26. The court cited Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979) and United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
42. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
43. Id at 252. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas noted that Terry "went fur-
ther than we need go here." Id Justice Douglas did add that "theoretically. . .detention of mail
could at some point become an unreasonable seizure," but stated that detention for ninety minutes
pending an investigation was not excessive. Id
44. 626 F.2d at 26.
45. Id
46. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
47. The automobile search exception was set forth in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), in which the Court upheld a warrantless search with probable cause of an automobile on
grounds that the automobile's inherent mobility makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant in
advance of the search. See also supra note 24.
1096
Vol. 1982:1089] AIRPORT SEIZURES OF LUGG4 GE 1097
cording to the Court, is not lessened by carrying the luggage in an
automobile.48
Applying the Sanders rationale, the Klein court held that the de-
fendants' privacy interest in the contents of their luggage was not vio-
lated by a mere seizure based on reasonable suspicion.49 The court
reasoned that a person had a lesser expectation of privacy in the
outside of luggage than in its contents. Accordingly, as long as the con-
tents were not disturbed by a warrantless search, seizing the-luggage
without probable cause would not intrude on any significant privacy
interests.50
In United States v. Viegas,5t the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit delivered a holding similar to the holding of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in Klein. The Viegas court cited Van
Leeuwen and Klein in upholding the conviction of a man whose lug-
gage was seized without a warrant, submitted to a sniff search, and sub-
sequently opened pursuant to a warrant.5 2 The court recognized that
the defendant was inconvenienced by the seizure of the luggage but
concluded that "the impact on his reasonable expectation of privacy
m ..in no way compares with an actual search of the contents. '53
Although the issue of airport seizures of luggage without probable
cause appeared to be rather easily resolved by the courts in Klein and
Viegas,54 two later cases have made it apparent that the issue is far
48. 442 U.S. at 764.
49. 626 F.2d at 26.
50. The Klein court again used Van Leeuwen for support. See id In Van Leeuwen, Justice
Douglas noted that "[n]o interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded" by detaining
the packages: "[tihe significant Fourth Amendment interest was in the privacy of this first-class
mail; and that privacy was not disturbed or invaded until the approval of the magistrate was
obtained." United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253.
51. 639 F.2d 42 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
52. 639 F.2d at 45.
53. Id (citations omitted). In Viegas, DEA agents stopped the defendant at the airport after
he had concluded his air travel and was on his way home. The court noted that the defendant
would have been more inconvenienced if he had been continuing on to another destination. Id
In a later case, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that even this greater inconvenience
was "not of sufficient degree to require a different result." United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71, 74
(1st Cir. 1981),petition for cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3132 (U.S. Aug. 14, 1981) (No. 81-307).
The First Circuit, however, has recognized that at some point seizures of luggage without
probable cause will be unconstitutional. See United States v. Regan, No. 81-1722, slip op. (1st Cir.
Sept. 1, 1982). In Regan, the court held that a seizure resulting in a 22-hour detention of the
defendant's luggage without probable cause violated the fourth amendment. Id slip op. at 11.
The court viewed the lengthy detention as too intrusive to be permitted under Terry: "A rule
allowing long-term baggage detentions on anything less than probable cause seems to us simply
too dangerous to be accepted." Id slip op. at 12 (emphasis in original).
54. The Klein court treated the issue in a few paragraphs. See 626 F.2d at 26. The Viegas
court treated it in one paragraph. See 639 F.2d at 45.
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from resolved.55 In United States v. Martell,56 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that Terry did not apply to the seizure of inani-
mate objects, but that such a seizure is nonetheless permissible as long
as it is reasonable.5 7 In United States v. Place,58 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit stated that seizures of luggage should be permit-
ted under Terry to the same extent as seizures of persons are
permitted.59
B. The Four Approaches.
The four possible approaches60 to determining the constitutional-
ity of airport seizures of luggage are illustrated in the majority and dis-
senting opinions in United States v. Martell61 and United States v.
Place.62
The first approach permits all reasonable seizures of luggage and
rejects the interpretation that there are certain limited exceptions to the
fourth amendment probable cause requirement. Instead, the fourth
amendment provides a general standard of reasonableness on which all
searches and seizures must be judged.63 This approach was first
applied to seizures of luggage by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
55. See United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981), petitionfor cert. fled, 50
U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Mar. 15, 1982) (No. 81-1772); United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982).
56. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981),petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Mar. 15,
1982) (No. 81-1772).
57. Id at 1363. The court upheld a seizure which resulted in a 20-minute detention of the
defendant's luggage. The dissent contended that probable cause was required for all seizures of
luggage. Id at 1365.
58. 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982).
59. Id at 50. The court held that a seizure of the defendant's luggage resulting in a 90-
minute detention was unconstitutional; the court commented, however, that it was "willing also to
apply the principles of Terry to seizures of property." Id. The dissent argued that a seizure of
luggage was less intrusive than a seizure of the person and that a longer detention was therefore
permissible under Terry. Id at 55.
60. See supra text following note 35.
61. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981),petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Mar. 15,
1982) (No. 81-1772).
62. 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982).
63. The view that the fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures is
drawn from an expansive interpretation of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). Seesupra
notes 26 & 29; see also Note, Gauging the Reasonableness of Nonarrest Seizures: The Emerging Rule
of Michigan v. Summers, 46 ALB. L. REv. 631 (1982) (Michigan v. Summers creates a rule of
reasonableness to judge all searches and seizures without probable cause).
This interpretation has been questioned. See, e.g., Bernstein & Eisenstein, 1981 Supreme
Court Update: The Criminal Law, TRIAL 54, 56 (Oct. 1981); Comment, Reasonable Suspicion Au-
thorizes Detention of Occupants of Validly SearchedPremises, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1393, 1393 (1982)
(Michigan v. Summers represents a new exception to the fourth amendment probable cause
requirement).
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Circuit in United States v. Martell.64 The court, over a strong dissent,
upheld a seizure resulting in a twenty-minute detention of the defend-
ants' luggage without probable cause.65
In a startling departure from Klein and Viegas, the Martell court
held that Terry and its progeny do not apply to the seizure of inanimate
objects.6 6 The court perceived a "conceptual difference" between a
seizure of persons and the seizure of their luggage67 and interpreted
the language of Dunaway v. New York 68-that any seizure of a person
is "a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment" 69-to limit Terry's appli-
cability.70 The Martell court concluded that in light of Dunaway, Terry
does not apply to the seizure of inanimate objects, "a seizure of which
constitutes a substantially less serious intrusion upon rights of the
individual."71
Instead of applying Terry, the court used a general fourth amend-
ment standard of reasonableness to judge the seizure of the defendants'
suitcases. 72 The court cited several cases that upheld either a border
search or an administrative search, and noted that the courts in these
cases did not consider their decisions exceptions to the probable cause
requirement.73 Rather, "[t]hese decisions are bottomed upon the con-
cept that in the light of all the circumstances the searches are not unrea-
sonable by constitutional standards." 74
64. 654 F.2d at 1357-63.
65. On September 30, 1979, DEA agents in San Diego, alerted by authorities in Anchorage,
began surveillance of Martell and Minneci at the San Diego airport. The agents followed the two
men to a hotel. Martell then left the hotel with a third man in a pickup truck driving in a manner
apparently designed to avoid surveillance. Martell soon returned to the hotel, at which time he
and Minneci went back to the airport and purchased two tickets to Anchorage. The agents
stopped the two men in the terminal. After the men refused to consent to a search of their lug-
gage, the agents escorted them to the Harbor Police Office and subjected the luggage to a sniff
search. When the drug detector dog gave a positive alert for narcotics the agents obtained a
search warrant, and a search revealed a large quantity of cocaine.
66. 654 F.2d at 1359.
67. Id at 1358.
68. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See supra note 33.
69. Id at 209 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
70. United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d at 1359.
71. Id at 1359 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
72. United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d at 1359.
73. Id at 1360; see, ag., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (upheld border
search); United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.) (upheld admission of narcotics discov-
ered during an administrative search of luggage of airplane passengers leaving Hawaii; search
conducted to prevent exportation of plants, pests, and diseases), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1972).
74. United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d at 1361. The court cited Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692 (1981), in support of its holding that warrantless searches and seizures without probable
cause are permissible as long as they are not unreasonable. 654 F.2d at 1361 n.3; see also supra
notes 26, 29 & 63.
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The court's decision to apply a reasonableness standard rather
than to apply Terry was crucial to the outcome of the case. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had previously interpreted Dunaway
as placing a maximum time limit on the detention of persons who were
held only on reasonable suspicion.75 Because the detention of the de-
fendants and their suitcases in Martell was for a length of time equal to
the detention period in Dunaway, the court would have had a difficult
time upholding the seizure under Terry and Dunaway.7 6 By not apply-
ing Terry, the court was free to examine the reasonableness of the
seizure of the suitcases without the specific time limit restriction.
In applying a reasonableness standard, the court held that the
seizure of the defendants' luggage was lawful. The court noted that the
twenty-minute detention was well within the ninety-minute detention
permitted in United States v. Van Leeuwen.77 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that because an actual search of the luggage was not con-
ducted until a search warrant was obtained, the defendants' right to
privacy had not been violated.78
The second approach to the constitutionality of airport seizures of
luggage prohibits all seizures of luggage without probable cause. Judge
Nelson adopted this approach in her dissent in Marte11.79 She agreed
with the majority that Terry did not apply to the seizure of the defend-
ants' luggage, but took exception to the majority's interpretation of the
75. See United States v. Wasserteil, 641 F.2d 704, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981); supra note 33.
76. As a result, the court declined to decide whether the detention resulting from the seizure
of the defendants exceeded the time limits of Dunaway and Terry. United States v. Martell, 654
F.2d at 1361 n.4. The court concluded that even if the detention of the defendants amounted to an
illegal arrest, the narcotics were discovered solely as a result of a lawful seizure of the defendant's
luggage and therefore the seizure of the narcotics was not tainted by the unlawful arrest. Id at
1361-62.
77. Id at 1360.
78. Id at 1362-63. This was the essence of the Klein court's position when it relied on Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
One month after Martell was decided, a different panel of Ninth Circuit judges held that a
seizure of property could be permitted only if supported by probable cause. See United States v.
O'Connor, 658 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1981). The O'Connor court neither discussed nor cited Martell
in its opinion.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Belcher, 685 F.2d 289 (9th
Cir. 1982), attempted to distinguish Martell and O'Connor. In Belcher, the court held that all
seizures of luggage without probable cause were unconstitutional. The court stated that in Martell
the luggage was not in the possession of the defendant and that, therefore, the seizure was an
insignificant intrusion that did not require the existence of probable cause. Id at 290. Judge
Norris, concurring in Belcher, aptly noted that nothing in Judge Curtis' opinion in Martell sup-
ported the court's view; "nor did Judge Curtis offer [the absence of possession] as important to his
holding." Id at 291 (Norris, J., concurring). Judge Norris urged the Ninth Circuit to act en banc
and "repair the damage" of Martell. Id at 292.
79. 654 F.2d at 1363 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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fourth amendment. Judge Nelson viewed the fourth amendment as
containing a warrant requirement for every search and seizure, subject
to certain specific exceptions.80 For support, she quoted passages from
the same cases cited by the majority in support of its interpretation that
the fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and
seizures.8' The judge concluded that, because the seizure of inanimate
objects does not fit into any of the well-established exceptions, the
seizure of defendants' suitcases without a warrant was unlawful.82
Judge Nelson also rebutted the majority's use of Van Leeuwen as
precedent, presenting compelling reasons why Van Leeuwen has no
"application outside the mail context."8 3 In her dissent, the judge
noted that Van Leeuwen was the only case cited to support the warrant-
less seizure of an inanimate object without probable cause, yet Justice
Douglas' short opinion in Van Leeuwen gave no indication that it was
setting out such a broad new interpretation of the fourth amendment.8 4
Judge Nelson maintained that Van Leeuwen only established the
boundaries of fourth amendment protection with respect to the privacy
interests in the contents of mail.8 5 She argued that because mail is vol-
untarily released to government officials, the detention of mail repre-
sents a lesser intrusion than does the seizure of an object in possession
of the individual.86
80. Id at 1363-64.
81. Id at 1364-65 (discussing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977)) ("Tlhe
'border search' exception. . . is a long-standing, historically recognized exception to the Fourth
Amendment's general principle that a warrant be obtained.. ."); United States v. Schafer, 461
F.2d 856 (9th Cir.) (in administrative search context, "It]he proposition is firmly established that
'except' in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property is 'unreasonable'
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant") (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1972)). See supra text accompanying notes
73-74. Judge Nelson also summarily dismissed Mfichigan . Summers, stating in a footnote that
Summers only deals with the detention of people. See United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d at 1365
n.2 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
82. United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d at 1365 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
83. Id at 1366-69.
84. Judge Nelson stated that it is "unlikely that the Van Leeuwen Court would think to dis-
pense with both the probable cause and warrant requirements in a broad range of cases without an
extended discussion of the careful balancing of interests that would lead to such a result." Id at
1366-67.
85. Id at 1367. The dissent noted that Justice Douglas began by emphasizing the important
privacy interests in the contents of one's mail and then concluded that there was "no possible
invasion" of fourth amendment rights when the mail was merely detained. Id (quoting United
States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970)).
86. In fact, the detention of mail in Van Leeuwen was not really a seizure at all. The Van
Leeuwen Court at no point labelled the detention of the mail a seizure; the Court stated that "[n]o
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded by forwarding the packages the follow-
ing day rather than the day when they were deposited." United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S.
at 253.
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The third approach to the constitutionality of airport seizures of
luggage is based on an interpretation of Terry that permits seizures of
luggage to the same extent that it permits seizures of persons. This ap-
proach resembles the second approach in that it interprets the fourth
amendment as prohibiting searches and seizures without probable
cause, subject to certain exceptions, one of which is the Terry stop and
frisk. The key distinction is that the third approach applies the Terry
exception to inanimate objects. Thus, whereas a seizure of luggage
without probable cause is per se unconstitutional under the second ap-
proach, such a seizure is permissible under the third approach as an
exception to the probable cause requirement. In short, the third ap-
proach applies the same constitutional standards to seizures of luggage
as are applied to Terry seizures of persons.87 In United States v.
Place,88 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first advanced the
theory that seizures of luggage without probable cause should be al-
lowed to the same extent as Terry seizures of persons. The Place ma-
jority held that the ninety-minute detention of the defendant's luggage
without probable cause was an unconstitutional seizure within the
meaning of Terry.8 9 After stating that "with rare exceptions"-such as
the Terry stop exception-all warrantless seizures are per se unreasona-
Judge Nelson also distinguished Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), stating that in
Sanders, since the Court found probable cause, presumably the only issue was whether the police
had to obtain a warrant to search the suitcase. Id at 1365-66 n.3. Exigent circumstances and
probable cause presumably justified the warrantless search; these two elements were absent in
Martell. Id
87. Thus, a seizure of luggage will not be permitted if a similar seizure of the person would
have been an unconstitutional Terry stop. The "rule" is particularly important with respect to
seizures resulting in lengthy detentions of luggage: because seizures of persons that result in
lengthy detentions are unconstitutional, see supra note 33, under the "rule," seizures of luggage
resulting in detentions of the same length will also be held unconstitutional.
88. 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982).
89. Two Dade County detectives stopped the defendant in Place at the Miami International
Airport. The detectives spotted him nervously scanning the terminal, asked him for identification,
and asked permission to examine his baggage. The defendant agreed, but the detectives, noticing
that the defendant's flight to New York left in five minutes, allowed him to depart.
Two DEA agents in New York, alerted by the detectives, observed the defendant walking
through the terminal at LaGuardia Airport continuously scanning the area. After the defendant
had picked up his baggage, the agents stopped him and asked to see his ticket and identification.
The agents then asked the defendant if he would consent to a search of his luggage. The defend-
ant refused, and the agents seized the suitcases and told the defendant he was free to go. One and
a half to two hours later the suitcases were subjected to a sniff search at Kennedy Airport. The
dog reacted positively to one of the bags and a search warrant was obtained. The search uncov-
ered 1,125 grams of cocaine, and the defendant was subsequently convicted of possession. United
States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) rev'd, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982).
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ble,90 the court concluded that the same Terry principles that apply to
seizures of persons must be applied to seizures of property.9' Other-
wise, according to the court, the warrantless seizure would "clearly vio-
late" the fourth amendment. 92
In applying the Terry principles equally to seizures of persons and
property, the majority rejected the theory that the inconvenience and
intrusion is less when a person's luggage is seized. The Place court
stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not draw any distinction
between an unlawful seizure of a person and the similar seizure of his
property," noting that "[i]n both cases there is an infringement of the
person's freedom of action. '93 The Place court noted that if the agents
had taken the defendant into custody for almost two hours in order to
allow a dog to conduct a sniff search of his person, the lengthy deten-
tion would have been a seizure in violation of his fourth amendment
rights under Dlunaway. 94 That the agents chose to seize his luggage in-
stead should not create a different result, the court reasoned. There-
fore, the court held that the detention of luggage without probable
cause for a period of over ninety minutes was an unlawful warrantless
seizure within the meaning of Terry.95 Like the dissent in Martell, the
Place court distinguished Van Leeuwen, viewing it as limited to the
detention of mail.96 The court also distinguished Klein, Viegas, and
West, noting that in these cases the duration of the detention was con-
siderably less than that of the detention in Place.97
The fourth approach, adopted by Judge Kaufman in his dissent in
Place98 and by the courts in Klein, Viegas, and West 99 takes the view
that Terry permits seizures of luggage to a greater extent than it permits
90. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 47 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)).
91. Id at 50.
92. Id
93. Id at 51. "Police custody of his person precludes him from freely moving about. Police
custody of his baggage deprives him of the use of it and its contents. Both create uncertainty and
anxiety on his part." Id
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id at 52-53. The court stated: "Unlike the dispossession of hand baggage in a person's
custody. . . the mere detention of mail not in his custody or control amounts to at most a mini-
mal or technical inteference with his person or effects, resulting in no personal deprivation at all."
Id
97. Id at 53. The author of the Place opinion, Judge Mansfield, affirmed the conviction of a
traveler in United States v. Casey, No. H-78-74 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 1979), a'd, No. 79-1109 (2d
Cir. June 14, 1979). In Casey, the defendant's bag was seized without probable cause and held for
over a day before a sniff search was conducted.
98. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 54 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
99. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
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seizures of persons. The rationale behind this approach is that the
seizure of luggage amounts to a lesser intrusion on privacy interests
than does the seizure of persons. This lesser intrusion justifies a longer
detention.
In his dissent in Place, Judge Kaufman distinguished between tak-
ing a person into custody and seizing a person's property. The latter,
according to the Judge, entails a minimal intrusion of privacy interests.
Judge Kaufman contended that "a person's principal privacy interest
lies not in the baggage itself, but in the contents."'10 According to the
dissent, as long as the contents are not searched without a warrant, the
person's privacy interests are not violated. Thus, the minimal intrusion
of a mere seizure balanced against the compelling government interest
in preventing drug smuggling justifies a longer detention of luggage
than would be allowed of a person.101 Finally, Judge Kaufman main-
tained that Van Leeuwen applied to seizures of luggage, 0 2 reasoning
that the difference between the privacy interest in property placed in
the mail and property held by an individual was a "nebulous
distinction."' 0 3
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR APPROACHES
The threshold question in an analysis of airport seizures of luggage
without probable cause is whether such seizures should be permitted
under any circumstances. One could conclude, as did Judge Nelson in
Martell, that all seizures of luggage without probable cause are uncon-
stitutional.1 4 Such a rule, however, would greatly hamper law en-
forcement efforts to combat drug smuggling. When law enforcement
officers have a reasonable suspicion that a person is carrying narcotics,
they are permitted to seize and detain him briefly for investigative pur-
poses. To prohibit the officers from also seizing his luggage would frus-
trate the purpose of seizing the person. 0 5 The seizure of the person
100. 660 F.2d at 55 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764
(1979) and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 n.8 (1977)).
101. 660 F.2d at 55 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). In addition, Judge Kaufman maintained that
Van Leeuwen applied to seizures of luggage, reasoning that the difference between the privacy
interest in property placed in the mail and property held by an individual was a "nebulous distinc-
tion." Id at 55-56. Judge Kaufman also found Klein, Viegas, and West indistinguishable. Id at
56 n.2.
102. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 56.
103. Id
104. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
105. Presumably, under a rule that all seizures of luggage without probable cause are uncon-
stitutional, a person not under suspicion could carry away the luggage when the possessor of the
luggage was seized unless the officers had probable cause to believe that the suitcase contained
contraband.
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allows the officers to conduct a brief investigation in which the suspect
will either verify or dispel the officer's suspicion. If the officers are un-
able to have a drug detector dog conduct a brief sniff search of the
person's luggage, they may be unable to determine whether their suspi-
cion is justified.
Assuming, then, that some airport seizures of luggage without
probable cause are permissible, the task is to articulate a theory defin-
ing which seizures should be permitted and establishing the standard
by which they should be judged. Under the reasonableness theory
adopted by the Martell majority, all airport seizures without probable
cause would be judged on a case-by-case balancing of the governmen-
tal interest against the intrusion that the search and seizure entails. Al-
lowing such an ad hoc determination, however, would emasculate the
general rule that only searches and seizures conducted with probable
cause are reasonable; 0 6 specifically, it would give the police a great
deal of discretion by requiring only that they act "reasonably."'' 0 7
Furthermore, the Court has held that warrantless searches and
seizures with probable cause are recognized as "well-delineated" excep-
tions108 and that there must be "a showing by those who seek exemp-
tion . . . that the exigencies of the situation [make] that course
imperative."' 109 In light of such a strict standard for warrantless
searches and seizures with probable cause, it is fallacious to assert that
any search and seizure without probable cause should be permitted as
long as it is reasonable.
A better interpretation of the fourth amendment would treat
airport seizures of luggage without probable cause as falling under the
Terry stop exception to the probable cause requirement. 0 This inter-
106. The Supreme Court expressly rejected such an ad hoc determination of reasonableness in
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979). See Comment, Reasonable Suspicion Authorizes
Detention oaOccupants of Validly Searched Premises, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1393, 1406 (1982); see also
supra note 33.
107. The Court in Dunaway stated that "the protections intended by the Framers could all too
easily disappear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented
by different cases, especially when that balancing must be done in the first instance by police
officers engaged in the 'often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'" 442 U.S. at 213
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
108. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1972). See supra notes 24-25.
109. Id at 455 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
110. The interpretation rejects the theory that searches and seizures without probable cause
should be judged by a general rule of reasonableness. See supra notes 29 & 63 and accompanying
text. Instead, searches and seizures without probable cause should be permitted under well-de-
fined exceptions to the fourth amendment probable cause requirement. See Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text. Each exception should
be clearly limited to prevent any one exception from swallowing the requirement of probable
cause. Id at 213. These exceptions would be justified on the basis of both a strong governmental
1105
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pretation permits seizures of luggage without probable cause if the law
enforcement officer has a reasonable suspicion that the luggage con-
tains contraband. But the right to seize an individual's luggage pursu-
ant to Terry must be strictly circumscribed.
Contrary to Judge Kaufman's contention in his Place dissent, the
seizure of luggage is highly intrusive.' Judge Kaufman stresses the
minimally intrusive nature of a seizure of luggage, noting that the indi-
vidual's privacy interest is protected by the procurement of a warrant
before the contents are searched."l2 His view that the individual's ex-
pectation of privacy' 13 is not violated as long as the contents are not
exposed without a warrant"14 adopts too narrow a definition of
intrusion.
The Supreme Court has stated that the legitimate expectations of
privacy protected by the fourth amendment stem from real and per-
sonal property concepts.' Is Nothing could be a more fundamental per-
sonal property concept than the right of a person in possession and
control of his property to expect that he will be able to maintain control
over his property until he voluntarily relinquishes possession. A
seizure of his property violates his legitimate privacy expectations and,
interest and the very minimal intrusion that the conduct entails. An important factor in evaluat-
ing the particular search and seizure would be an examination of the viable alternatives. If the
governmental interest could be adequately served by less intrusive conduct, the particular search
and seizure should be declared a violation of the fourth amendment.
At least two Supreme Court cases dealing with the lawfulness of a particular Terry search and
seizure have noted the importance of either the existence of or lack of viable alternatives. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding spot-check stops unreasonable under the
fourth amendment but noting that roadblock-type stops might be a permissible alternative);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (noting lack of practical alternatives for
policing border in upholding Terry stop by roving Border Patrol).
The interpretation serves as an adequate substitute for a requirement of probable cause. It
allows law enforcement agents to advance important recognized governmental interests in certain
situations without a strict requirement that they believe criminal activity is present. At the same
time, by permitting only minimally intrusive conduct, it ensures that the fourth amendment rights
of individuals are not eroded. Finally, this interpretation reduces the risk of untrammeled police
discretion by establishing delineated exceptions instead of ad hoc determinations of reasonable-
ness. See United States v. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213-14; supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
112. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 54-55 (Kaufman, J., dissenting); see supra notes 98-100
and accompanying text.
113. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (individuals' legitimate expectations of
privacy are protected by the fourth amendment).
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
115. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). In Rakas, the Court held that a passen-
ger in an automobile, who asserts neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile,
does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the automobile searched. Id at
148.
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therefore, the owner deserves fourth amendment protection." 6
Airport seizures of luggage are particularly intrusive. A seizure of
luggage represents a significant restriction on the traveler's freedom of
action.' '7 As the Place majority correctly demonstrated, the seizure of
a person's luggage "deprives him of the use of it and its contents."" 8
Indeed, the seizure of a person's luggage can result in a de facto seizure
of the person. Without access to his luggage, the traveler may be un-
able to fly to his destination. The result is that the traveler is "seized"
as surely as if the law enforcement officers had prevented him from
leaving. 119
Because airport seizures of luggage without probable cause are so
intrusive, such seizures should only be permitted subject to strict stan-
dards. Consistent with the approach adopted by the Place majority, 20
the law should permit seizures of luggage without probable cause for
no longer a period than it would permit the seizure of the person. In
other words, courts should apply the same constitutional standards to
seizures of luggage as they apply to seizures of persons.
There is another compelling justification for according similar
treatment to seizures of luggage and persons. If a person is seized on a
116. The intrusive dispossession that occurred in Martell and Place is very different from the
detention of the packages in Van Leeuwen. In Van Leeuwen the packages were not in the defend-
ant's possession when they were detained. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252.
Indeed, the defendant probably was not aware that the packages had been detained. Even if he
was aware of the detention, he had little or no expectation of using the packages or their contents
at the moment they were detained. Instead, he had the expectation that the packages would arrive
at their destination in a reasonable time. To detain the packages for 90 minutes, until probable
cause was established, as was done in Van Leeuwen, would not cause the packages to arrive unrea-
sonably late. If the packages in Van Leeuwen had been detained for several days without prob-
able cause, the defendant would have had a strong case that the detention was an unlawful
seizure. Presumably, this is what Justice Douglas meant when he stated that at some point the
detention could have become an unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. See
Id
117. See United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977). In McCain, the defendant's
luggage was seized and searched by airport customs inspectors pursuant to a valid border search.
Meanwhile, the defendant was interrogated and subsequently confessed to having a bag of co-
caine in her body. The Court held that the cocaine must be suppressed as evidence because the
defendant had not been given Miranda warnings. Id at 256. The court noted that even if the
defendant was not physically restrained from leaving, "she was obviously able to leave only if she
was willing to abandon her luggage, and this itself is a sufficient restriction on one's freedom of
action so as to trigger the giving of Miranda warnings before proceeding with any interrogation."
Id at 255.
118. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 51. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
119. See United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d at 255; 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 9.6(e)(Supp.
1982) (seizure of luggage may be "tantamount" to a seizure of the person "because that person
must either remain on the scene or else seemingly surrender his effects permanently to the
police").
120. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
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reasonable suspicion, he must be released after a brief period of time if
the law enforcement officers do not establish probable cause to arrest.
An officer should not be able to circumvent the requirement of brevity
by releasing the suspect after a few minutes yet retaining his luggage
indefinitely until he can establish probable cause to arrest.
Therefore, if a law enforcement officer has a reasonable and ar-
ticulable suspicion both that a person is engaged in criminal activity
and that the luggage he is in possession of may contain contraband, the
officer should be permitted to seize the luggage and detain it for a brief
period to determine if there is probable cause to search its contents. If
after a brief investigation the officer does not find probable cause to
search, he must release the person's luggage. If the officer reasonably
believes that a sniff search of the suspect's luggage would confirm or
dispel his suspicions, he should be able to submit the luggage to a sniff
search, provided that it would not result in a lengthy detention of the
luggage.
Imposing a requirement that the detention resulting from the
seizure be brief would not cause a great hardship to law enforcement
officials. In order to seize a person under Terry, an officer must have a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in crim-
inal activity.' 2' Generally, this suspicion stems from observations of
odd behavior such as a person nervously scanning the airport terminal,
or ascertaining curious information, such as noting conflicting identifi-
cation on the person's luggage. 22 In most cases, very little investiga-
tion would be necessary to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions. If
the officer is still not satisfied but does not have enough information to
establish probable cause, he could release the person and his luggage
and continue surveillance. Also, he could attempt to establish probable
cause independent.of a custodial interrogation. It is more likely, how-
ever, that the detainee will clear up the suspicion adequately or, after a
brief interrogation, that the officer will have probable cause to arrest. 23
Requiring that a sniff search not result in a lengthy detention also
does not create a hardship. The need for a sniff search arises- in the
context of an investigative stop made on the suspicion that the person is
carrying narcotics. This stop frequently takes place in major airports
where the DEA has concentrated its efforts to detect drug smugglers. It
would not be excessively burdensome to require that agents wishing to
121. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); supra note 27.
122. See supra note 3.
123. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond,
67 MICH. L. REv. 39, 93 (1968).
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conduct sniff searches keep a drug detector dog at the airport while
they are maintaining surveillance. 124
IV. CONCLUSION
Any relaxation of the probable cause requirement by the Supreme
Court should be made with extreme caution to ensure that individuals'
fourth amendment rights are not violated. The farther that the Court
strays from judging fundamental rights on the basis of a long-estab-
lished objective standard, the more likely that such rights will be
eroded. This danger lends support to the approach of maintaining care-
fully delineated exceptions to the probable cause requirement.
Broad and undefined standards, such as a standard of reasonable-
ness, carry with them the great risk of gradual erosion of fourth amend-
ment protections. For this reason, the Terry investigative stop and frisk
exception to the probable cause requirement should be narrowly con-
strued to permit only minimally intrusive conduct in the face of a com-
pelling governmental interest. The government has a compelling
interest in preventing the widespread trafficking of narcotics; conse-
quently, airport seizures of luggage without probable cause should be
permitted under Terry. One must recognize, however, that the seizure
of luggage is nonetheless a severe intrusion that should be accorded
application of the same fourth amendment standards applied to the
seizure of persons.
John M Schohl
124. See United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 52.
Moreover, if seizures of luggage are to be permitted on only a reasonable suspicion, the bur-
dens of complying with the requirement should be borne by the police. United States v. Regan,
687 F.2d 531, 538 n.8 (Ist Cir. 1982):
Were the rule otherwise-were delays of one, two or more days to be accepted by
courts-drug enforcement personnel might use only one detector dog to service an entire
metropolitan area, and suitcases might be piled high in the security room awaiting the
dog's weekly or bi-monthly rounds. We think that where the only basis for holding
luggage is reasonable suspicion, expeditious action is essential.
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